Suchergebnisse

In this paper, we investigate the power of migration as a mechanism in the transmission of social norms, taking Mali and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) as a case study. Mali has a strong FGM culture and a long-standing history of migration. We use an original household-level database coupled with census data to analyze the extent to which girls living in localities with high rates of return migrants are less prone to FGM. Malians migrate predominantly to other African countries where female circumcision is uncommon (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire) and to countries where FGM is totally banned (France and other developed countries) and where anti-FGM information campaigns frequently target African migrants. Taking a two-step instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity of migration and return decisions, we show that return migrants have a negative and significant influence on FGM practices. More precisely, we show that this result is primarily driven by the flow of returnees from Cote d'Ivoire. We also show that adults living in localities with return migrants are more informed about FGM and in favor of legislation. The impact of returnees may occur through several channels, including compositional effects, changes in return migrants' attitudes toward FGM, and return migrants convincing stayers to change their FGM practices.

This paper studies political competition in the case of a democratization process.We present an illustrative model describing political competition when the opposition threatens the stability of the country. In some cases, our model predicts the government should invest in opposition districts to avoid political agitation. This contrasts withexisting literature on established democracies, where public funds usually target ruling, party supporters or electorally tight districts.We empirically observe the first democratic changeover in Ghana in 2000. Implement-ing a diff-in-diff strategy, we find that districts with a leading political party memberappear to receive slightly more public funds when their party is not in charge. Thisphenomenon is found in urban areas and in areas that vote the most for this leadingmember's party. Hence it occurs in places with the potential for political agitation.

This paper studies political competition in the case of a democratization process.We present an illustrative model describing political competition when the opposition threatens the stability of the country. In some cases, our model predicts the government should invest in opposition districts to avoid political agitation. This contrasts withexisting literature on established democracies, where public funds usually target ruling, party supporters or electorally tight districts.We empirically observe the first democratic changeover in Ghana in 2000. Implement-ing a diff-in-diff strategy, we find that districts with a leading political party memberappear to receive slightly more public funds when their party is not in charge. Thisphenomenon is found in urban areas and in areas that vote the most for this leadingmember's party. Hence it occurs in places with the potential for political agitation.

This paper studies political competition in the case of a democratization process.We present an illustrative model describing political competition when the opposition threatens the stability of the country. In some cases, our model predicts the government should invest in opposition districts to avoid political agitation. This contrasts withexisting literature on established democracies, where public funds usually target ruling, party supporters or electorally tight districts.We empirically observe the first democratic changeover in Ghana in 2000. Implement-ing a diff-in-diff strategy, we find that districts with a leading political party memberappear to receive slightly more public funds when their party is not in charge. Thisphenomenon is found in urban areas and in areas that vote the most for this leadingmember's party. Hence it occurs in places with the potential for political agitation.

This paper studies political competition in the case of a democratization process.We present an illustrative model describing political competition when the opposition threatens the stability of the country. In some cases, our model predicts the government should invest in opposition districts to avoid political agitation. This contrasts withexisting literature on established democracies, where public funds usually target ruling, party supporters or electorally tight districts.We empirically observe the first democratic changeover in Ghana in 2000. Implement-ing a diff-in-diff strategy, we find that districts with a leading political party memberappear to receive slightly more public funds when their party is not in charge. Thisphenomenon is found in urban areas and in areas that vote the most for this leadingmember's party. Hence it occurs in places with the potential for political agitation.

In this paper, we investigate how powerful a mechanism migration is in the transmission of socialnorms, taking Mali and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) as a case study. Mali has a strong FGMculture and a long-standing history of migration. We use an original household-level database coupledwith census data to analyze the extent to which girls living in villages with high rates of returnmigrants are less prone to FGM. Malians migrate predominantly to other African countries wherefemale circumcision is uncommon (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire) and to countries where FGM is totally banned(France and other developed countries) and where anti-FGM information campaigns frequently targetAfrican migrants. Taking a two-step instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity ofmigration decisions, we show that return migrants have a negative and significant influence on FGM.We also show that adults living in villages with return migrants are more in favor of legislation againstFGM. ; Dans cet article, nous examinons dans quelle mesure la migration est un vecteur de transferts denormes sociales en étudiant le lien entre migration et excision au Mali. Alors que l'excision estfortement répandue au Mali, ce pays a une forte tradition migratoire vers les pays limitrophes et lespays du Nord où l'excision est soit moins pratiquée soit sanctionnée par la loi. Nous testonsl'hypothèse que les migrants acquièrent des opinions différentes en la matière dans les pays d'accueiloù l'excision est moins fréquente voire interdite et qu'une fois de retour ils induisent un changementde comportement dans leurs villages d'origine. Nous mobilisons une base originale de données surl'excision des filles de 0 à 14 ans couplée avec des données de recensement qui permettent de mesurerles taux de migration (courante et de retour) des villages de résidence des personnes interrogées etmettons en oeuvre une méthode instrumentale pour contrôler de l'endogénéité de la migration. Nousmontrons que les migrants de retour ont effectivement une influence ...

In this paper, we investigate how powerful a mechanism migration is in the transmission of socialnorms, taking Mali and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) as a case study. Mali has a strong FGMculture and a long-standing history of migration. We use an original household-level database coupledwith census data to analyze the extent to which girls living in villages with high rates of returnmigrants are less prone to FGM. Malians migrate predominantly to other African countries wherefemale circumcision is uncommon (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire) and to countries where FGM is totally banned(France and other developed countries) and where anti-FGM information campaigns frequently targetAfrican migrants. Taking a two-step instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity ofmigration decisions, we show that return migrants have a negative and significant influence on FGM.We also show that adults living in villages with return migrants are more in favor of legislation againstFGM. ; Dans cet article, nous examinons dans quelle mesure la migration est un vecteur de transferts denormes sociales en étudiant le lien entre migration et excision au Mali. Alors que l'excision estfortement répandue au Mali, ce pays a une forte tradition migratoire vers les pays limitrophes et lespays du Nord où l'excision est soit moins pratiquée soit sanctionnée par la loi. Nous testonsl'hypothèse que les migrants acquièrent des opinions différentes en la matière dans les pays d'accueiloù l'excision est moins fréquente voire interdite et qu'une fois de retour ils induisent un changementde comportement dans leurs villages d'origine. Nous mobilisons une base originale de données surl'excision des filles de 0 à 14 ans couplée avec des données de recensement qui permettent de mesurerles taux de migration (courante et de retour) des villages de résidence des personnes interrogées etmettons en oeuvre une méthode instrumentale pour contrôler de l'endogénéité de la migration. Nousmontrons que les migrants de retour ont effectivement une influence ...

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers and that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this nding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this finding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this _nding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this _nding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this _nding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.